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ARTICLE
STRAIGHTENING THE PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FROM
LITIGATION TO CONSOLIDATING





Over the last two decades, the debate around international investment
law has gravitated around the pros and cons of investor-State dispute settle-
ment (ISDS) procedures.1 Such debate, which is still ongoing,2 has gener-
ated a backlash against a relatively young rule-oriented regime that, without
doubt, should be modernized and adjusted as a result of the learning curve
resulting from its application. However, a negative consequence of such
debate has been that it is distracting the attention of investment stakeholders
* Lead Private Sector Specialist, Trade Unit, World Bank Group (WBG); Nonresident Fel-
low, World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Bern; and Member of the Editorial Board of the
Journal of World Investment and Trade. The views expressed in this note do not represent the
views of the WBG and are the exclusive responsibility of the author.
1. Most international investment agreements (IIAs) enable foreign investors to directly en-
force investment protection guarantees included in those treaties against host States through inter-
national arbitration. This mechanism, known as investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), has been
the most controversial issue in international investment law and policy. For further explanation
and empirical data on the use of ISDS, see Roberto Echandi, The Debate on Treaty-Based Dispute
Settlement: Empirical Evidence (1987-2017) and Policy Implication, 34 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 32 (2019); SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVEST-
MENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2019); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1521 (2005); SCOTT MILLER & GREGORY N. HICKS, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLE-
MENT: A REALITY CHECK (Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., 2015); Emily Osmanski, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639 (2018); GUS VAN
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007).
2. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment (ISDS), Dispute Prevention and Mitigation—Means of Alternative Dispute Resolution, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.190 (Jan. 15, 2020).
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away from what should be the main focus of the debate about international
investment law.
This article calls attention to a problem that has not been properly ap-
praised until now in the context of international investment regulation. We
refer here to the significant amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) be-
ing lost in developing countries as a consequence of unattended grievances
arising from irregular government conduct.3 Thus, it seems that the debate
on ISDS has distracted both policy makers and academia away from a criti-
cal socio-economic function that international investment agreements (IIAs)
should play for development—that is, contributing to foster the degree of
long-term certainty and predictability in investor-State relations required to
mitigate political risk, thereby facilitating FDI projects to effectively get
established, operate, and expand in host countries.
Further, this note also summarizes recent research lead by the author.4
Such work demonstrates the lack of appropriate legal infrastructure, both at
a domestic and international level, enabling host States and investors to
manage their conflicts early enough. That is, before investors discontinue
their investment projects and grievances escalate into full-blown legal dis-
putes. Such absence of legal infrastructure is not only overemphasizing
ISDS as the only outlet to deal with grievances between investors and
States but is also claiming a significantly high opportunity cost for investors
and States alike.
This article argues that investor-State conflict management mecha-
nisms (CMMs) can fill this legal-infrastructure vacuum. Further, by incor-
porating CMMs into the framework of international investment regime,
international investment law could honor its original goal of enhancing in-
vestors’ confidence in undertaking FDI projects beyond their home States.5
3. While governments from developing countries compete in costly promotion campaigns
and incentives to attract FDI, data show that, every year, around one-quarter of all investors in-
vesting in developing countries discontinue their FDI projects as a result of unresolved grievances
with subnational or specialized regulatory agencies. See World Bank Group, Retention and Ex-
pansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy Responses (2019), http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/387801576142339003/Political-Risk-and-Policy-Responses
[hereinafter Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and
Policy Responses].
4. See Roberto Echandi, Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual
Framework for Investor-State Conflict Management, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW AND POLICY 270 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013) [hereinafter Comple-
menting Investor-State Dispute Resolution]; Roberto Echandi, Investor-State Conflict
Management: A Preliminary Sketch, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2014), https://transnational-dis-
pute-management.com/article.asp?key=2083 [hereinafter Investor-State Conflict Management];
Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy Re-
sponses, supra note 3.
5. JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT (POCKETBOOKS OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 14–15
(2007); KENNETH VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY AND INTER-
PRETATION (2010).
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Evidence suggests that CMMs can leverage IIAs to foster desired patterns
of administrative behavior in host States in a nonlitigious way.6 By address-
ing investor-State grievances well before they escalate into legal disputes,
CMMs enable both investors and States to address problems arising in the
course of investment operations, thereby contributing to the long-term per-
manence and expansion of FDI projects in the host State.7
Furthermore, this article has four additional sections. Section II starts
by colloquially explaining the political economy dynamics of investor-State
relationships. To make such a complex topic easier to grasp and more en-
joyable to the reader, the explanation has been framed within an analogy of
human relationships. Such approach will make very evident the limited
scope of the current discussion on international investment law. Section III
focuses on investor-State CMMs and its conceptual underpinnings. Section
IV summarizes recent research led by the author that focused on empirical
analysis on patterns of government conduct leading to FDI projects being
discontinued, as well as pilot projects that tested the CMM concept and the
specific protocols for setting up CMMs proposed by previous literature
work. Section V summarizes conclusions and includes some final
reflections.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY DYNAMICS OF INVESTOR-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS: STARTING WITH AN ANALOGY
In cross-border trade, goods or services are exported by the producer
from its home base without entailing a relocation of its productive facilities
to serve a market. In the case of undertaking cross-border investments, the
situation is very different. FDI necessarily presupposes a need for investors
to establish their productive facilities abroad, away from their home coun-
tries and jurisdictions, forcing them to operate in legal, economic, social,
and cultural environments that are not equally familiar to investors as their
home countries. FDI is thus inherently risky. These types of investments are
more than just transactions.8 They entail multidimensional relationships
among different stakeholders: there are foreign investors, governments, do-
mestic investors, and civil society.9
6. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 54.
7. Roberto Echandi & Mariana H.C. Gonstead, Investor-State Conflict Management: Sys-
temic Investment Response Mechanisms (SIRMS) and Shared Decisions System Design (SDSD), in
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 335, 336 (Thomas Cottier & Krista
Nadakavukaren Schefer eds., 2017).
8. Roberto Echandi, Connecting the Dots Between International Trade & Investment Regu-
lation, Investment Climate Reform & Development, CURRENT ISSUES IN ASIA PAC. FOREIGN DI-
RECT INV., THE APEC AUSTRALIAN STUDY CTR. 37 (2015).
9. Mariana H.C. Gonstead, From Problem to Potential: The Need to Go Beyond Inves-
tor–State Disputes and Integrate Civil Society, Investors and State at the Local Level, in POVERTY
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM: DUTIES TO THE WORLD’S POOR 225, 226
(Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer ed., 2013).
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An international firm that chooses to invest abroad and the government
that hosts that firm create an ongoing relationship. Too often, states focus
only on promotion and attracting new investors to their country.10 This is
important, but it is only one small part of the story. The greater benefits of
FDI for development come later on in the relationship, as the foreign firm
brings in capital, employs local staff, provides goods and services, gener-
ates exports, shares technology and know-how, sources from local suppli-
ers, and helps to diversify and upgrade the economy.11 Such potential
benefits take time. Thus, the critical point for policy making is to grasp the
idea that for FDI to contribute to social and economic development, it is
paramount to ensure that the relationship between the foreign investor and
the host country works in the long-term.
Such relationships have multiple dimensions. One way to visualize
them is to follow a sequential approach, demonstrating the investment life
cycle as comprising four basic stages.12 First, foreign investors are attracted
to invest into the host country. Second, such investment is established.
Third, the investment starts to operate and hopefully begins to expand. This
leads to the fourth stage where the investment project generates linkages
with other local firms, thereby “rooting” the FDI with the domestic
economy.
Thus, if a country wants to ensure that foreign investors come, stay,
and contribute to development, it is important for governments to undertake
certain behaviors at each stage of the relationship, aiming to improve the
quality of the interaction between the foreign firm and the domestic econ-
omy, and making sure that more investments get to the final stage of the
cycle—the point where they create the linkages and spillovers to move the
country up the value chain and generate more and better jobs to improve the
quality of life of the population.13
The easiest way to grasp the complexities of the political economy of
the FDI relationships is to invoke an analogy. In a way, as a human rela-
tionship phenomenon, the different stages of the FDI resemble those that
occur in a couple’s marriage. Both investment and marriage entail a long-
term commitment and involve significant resources of different kinds. Thus,
10. Roberto Echandi et al., The Impact of Investment Policy in a Changing Global Economy:
A Review of the Literature, at 11–14, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 7437 (Oct.
2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/664491467994693599/The-impact-of-invest
ment-policy-in-a-changing-global-economy-a-review-of-the-literature.
11. World Bank Group, Investment Policy and Promotion Diagnostics & Tools: Maximizing
the Potential Benefits of FDI for Competitiveness and Development, at 20 (July 13, 2017), http://
documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/666341500008847215/pdf/117475-PUBLIC-WP-13-7-
2017-12-8-30-SPIRAToolKitGuide.pdf [hereinafter Policy and Promotion].
12. Connecting the Dots Between International Trade & Investment Regulation, Investment
Climate Reform & Development, supra note 8, at 33–40.
13. Policy and Promotion, supra note 11, at 14–15.
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neither to embark in a FDI project nor to get married are decisions to be
taken lightly.
As in marriages, investments presuppose the need and interest of the
parties to seek a relationship. Like people, many investors may opt to re-
main single, do not undertake the risk of investing abroad, and remain in
their home markets. However, there are many incentives and needs for both
human beings and investors to take the risk of engaging in long-term rela-
tionships—either with another individual as in the marriage or with a coun-
try as in FDI relationships. Investors need (i) access to natural resources (ii)
access to consumers in bigger markets, or (iii) to produce in competitive
environments that may enable them to thrive in the significantly competi-
tive world market. This is the first stage of the cycle: to have clarity of
whether a relationship will be sought and the reasons for doing so. This






FIGURE 1. THE INVESTMENT LIFECYCLE14
Second, as in human relationships, it is not easy for investors to iden-
tify the most suitable partner that will enable their enterprise to achieve
their goals. At the same time, many countries may be seeking to attract
certain types of investors: many governments seem to dream of attracting
14. Id. at 15.
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big multinational enterprises that can generate thousands of jobs.15 As in
real life, it is not easy to find the ideal partner. Also, like in human relation-
ships, some people may be more attractive than others. In the investment
relationship, some countries will have a lot of “pull” for certain type of
investors. For instance, natural resource-rich countries will be extremely
attractive to investors involved in extractive activities.16 Countries with
huge domestic markets will also be attractive for those investors interested
in serving those consumers by selling their goods and products.17 However,
governments of those countries may be looking for other types of investors
to whom they may not be as attractive. Often, in those situations, govern-
ments tend to incur huge expenses to provide investment incentives to lure
investors—like dowries in human relations.18 However, data show that in
most cases, those costly incentives cannot compensate for other critical as-
pects that are real deal-breakers for investors.19
Further, the values and criteria guiding the search of both parties for
their respective partners may not be attuned to their needs or own realities.
For instance, while some governments may be looking to attract export-
oriented firms in high-tech activities, they may not be able to provide the
human resources, infrastructure, or business environment that such firms
require to operate. Further, some countries may not even be able to be on
the radar of certain “ideal” investors that most governments may be at-
tempting to lure. Indeed, visibility is a challenge for many small economies,
which often reach international economic press only when a natural disaster
or civil conflict erupts. Yes, like in human relationships, reputation matters
in the field of international investment.
Last but not least in this phase of investment attraction, which in
human relations would be the “courtship” stage of a relationship, informa-
tion asymmetries and image-building play a big role. Like human relation-
ships where people take care of their image in order to be accepted,
governments undertake costly investment promotion campaigns to show
their attributes to as many potential investors as possible. Further, govern-
ments, like people, will make all sorts of promises to their potential partners
in order to convince them to “say yes.” Governments will promise they will
behave in a fair, transparent, and lawful way. For such purpose, they will
show the various IIAs as proof of their commitment to a safe and predict-
15. Torfinn Harding & Beata S. Javorcik, Roll Out the Red Carpet and They Will Come:
Investment Promotion and FDI Inflows, 121 ECON. J. 1445, 1471 (2011).
16. John H. Dunning, The Determinants of International Production, 25 OXFORD ECON. PA-
PERS 289 (Nov. 1973); JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1993).
17. Dunning, The Determinants of International Production, supra note 16, at 307.
18. Id. at 306.
19. Sebastian James, Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications, at
13–14, WORLD BANK GROUP (Dec. 2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
27875.
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able relationship. This phase of investment attraction will conclude with a
decision by the parties—that is, the investor on the one hand, and the gov-
ernment on the other hand (often represented by their investment promotion
agency)—to go ahead with a particular investment project. Once such a
decision is made, the preparation for the formalities and establishment of
the investment project will start. The “wedding” between the investor and
the host country, materialized in the form of an investment announcement,
will then be circulated through economic mass media.
Once again, like human romantic relationships, many weddings are
planned and yet, someone gets “cold feet,” or the relationship is terminated
before the formal ceremony takes place. In the investment context, despite
an announcement, an investment project may never become materialized.
Often, investment projects get canceled despite the interest of investors to
establish their businesses in the host country. Legal or red-tape barriers tend
to frustrate a myriad of FDI projects. For instance, in Ethiopia, according to
Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) records, around 98 percent of in-
vestment cancellations between 2008 and 2018 took place in their establish-
ment phase (i.e., during the phase after an investment permit is granted and
before the issuance of business license).20
Continuing with the analogy, just as if a wedding celebration finally
takes place, the establishment and inauguration of an investment project
often represents an important celebratory event. Like photo flashes and fan-
fare in weddings, in the investment world government and investors alike
often celebrate the start of operations of a production plant or business by
inviting the press and organizing events colored by great optimism and en-
thusiasm due to the many productive jobs to be created and better economic
prospects for all. Contrary to what many government officials think, that is
not the end, but rather, just the beginning of the real relationship, which will
take significant effort to make work in the long term. In romantic relation-
ships, after the rosy period of planning and celebrating the wedding, the
couple must come back to reality and start facing everyday life together.
The same occurs in the context of the relationship between foreign investors
and host-State governments.
Constant interaction will certainly lead the couple to regularly address
a number of disagreements, either over trivial or important matters. An is-
sue that may be important to one may not be as important to the other.
Further, as part of becoming a new nuclear family, the newlywed couple
will also have to start interacting with their respective extended family-in-
law. Most of those in-laws may have their own views regarding their rela-
tive’s choice of spouse. Some may be very pleased with the new union,
some may be less enthusiastic, and some may be indifferent. However, re-
20. Ethiopia SIRM, EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (Feb. 27, 2019), https://ewsdata.rightsinde-
velopment.org/projects/603292-ethiopia-sirm.
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gardless of their views on the prospects of success of the newlyweds’ mar-
riage, none of those in-laws feel responsible for making such new marriage
work in the long term. The same happens in the investment world.
When an investor establishes the business in the host country, often
after having benefited from the support of that country’s investment promo-
tion agency, it will also have to interact with a plethora of additional public
agencies operating at national and subnational levels in that host country.
For instance, starting and undertaking operations forces foreign investors to
obtain a series of permits and licenses, leading to a constant interaction
between investors and the regulatory apparatus of the public administra-
tion.21 These agencies have specific regulatory priorities, such as ensuring
compliance with regulations on a diverse fan of matters like environmental,
labor, tax, health, safety, and other types of standards. Like family in-laws,
these agencies have their own priorities based on their respective legal man-
dates. And like in-laws, safeguarding the health of the investor-host govern-
ment relationship is not likely to rank at the top of such priorities. Indeed,
most specialized agencies exclusively focus on exercising their regulatory
activities. Seldom, if ever, are such regulatory authorities explicitly re-
minded of the importance of carrying out their functions in such a way as to
not harm the relationship between the investor and the host State. Further,
most of these regulatory authorities are not even aware of the existence of
IIAs, and even less of their contents.22
Within this context, it is not surprising that, once again, like many
marriages, interaction with in-laws generates tensions, disagreements, and
even divorces. In the investment context, it is not then surprising that more
than 70 percent of the investor-State disputes submitted to international ar-
bitration involve regulatory conduct undertaken by subnational or special-
ized regulatory agencies.23 Further, and continuing with the analogy of a
marriage, many divorces happen relatively quietly, and take place by mu-
tual consent of both parties, without any litigation in court. However, there
are divorces that tend to be particularly acrimonious, involving costly and
long legal battles with many lawyers involved. The same occurs with the
investor-State relationship.
The increase in investor-State arbitration cases over the last two de-
cades has attracted the attention of many academics and policy makers, to
the extent that ISDS has practically colored the evolution and discussion on
international investment law over the last two decades. Before addressing
21. World Bank Group, Investing Across Borders 2010: Indicators of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Regulation in 87 Economies (2010), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
27883.
22. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration II, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011), https://
unctad.org/system/files/official-document/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf [hereinafter Investor-State Dis-
putes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II].
23. Echandi, supra note 1, at 59–60.
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this point in more detail, and returning to the marriage analogy, it is impor-
tant to stress two points.
First, like in real life, it should not be assumed that relationships
should be maintained at all costs. Life and circumstances change, affecting
the well-being, values, and character of people. Sometimes it is better to
leave a relationship than continuing in a nonconstructive one. Once again,
the same occurs with the investor-State relationship. Indeed, not all FDI
retention should be perceived as good and not all FDI discontinuation as
bad. It makes a difference whether the cause of discontinuation of FDI is
economic (e.g., changes in the wage structure) or policy related (e.g., the
introduction of a discriminatory regulation).24 Or even within the latter cat-
egory, it matters whether the discontinuation is caused by the removal of a
subsidy (e.g., end of a tax break) or other form of policy preferences or to
policy uncertainty. Changes in the wage structure, for example, can be asso-
ciated to an upgrade in per capita income in the host country, leading to a
change in comparative advantage.25 Discontinuation of FDI would in this
case be a form of adjustment of the economic system that could be wel-
comed. On the opposite end of the spectrum, preserving tax breaks or other
forms of preferential arrangements for a long time just to retain FDI that
otherwise may not be economically viable may risk perpetuating inefficient
activities, maybe even for private gain.26 Therefore, like in real life di-
vorces, FDI discontinuation may happen both for the “right” or the “wrong”
reasons.
Within the context of international investment law, it is important to
clarify that the type of FDI discontinuation that should be prevented is that
which most governments would clearly aim to stop, that is, FDI discontinu-
ation that could have been prevented by just timely addressing investor-
State conflicts arising out of “irregular” government conduct. This type of
conduct can be defined as policies and actions that do not conform with the
substantive or procedural standards reasonably expected by affected inves-
tors—and most reasonable government officials—based on their reading of
the applicable treaties, laws, regulations, and practices in the host country.27
Given the multiplicity of regulatory agencies that in real life can affect FDI
projects, the goal of international investment law in this context should be
to provide basic principles and norms that serve as minimum parameters to
guide administrative conduct not only between government and investors,
but equally important, within the multiple government agencies, thereby
preventing lack of a coherent administrative action from pushing investors
away.
24. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 5.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5.
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The second point to be stressed to conclude the analogy between the
FDI and the marriage cycle is the main purpose of the investor-State rela-
tionship—that is, to generate a series of benefits for both parties, but partic-
ularly a series of spillovers contributing to socio-economic development in
the host State. Just like how marriages can lead to offspring, not only can
the investor-State relationship lead to a stable number of jobs, transfer of
know-how, technology, exports, and more, but FDI may also generate pro-
duction linkages with local firms, starting to source both tangible or intangi-
ble inputs in the form of services that are integrated into the former’s
productive process.28 This is the multiplier economic effect of investment in
the domestic economy. However, all these effects require time, and presup-
pose the success of the investor-State relationship despite the unavoidable
difficulties likely to arise in the normal course of operations between inves-
tors and public authorities of the host country.
Figure 2 below illustrates this analogy between the investor-State rela-
tionship and marriages. As the graphic shows, the lack of proper manage-
ment of problems and disagreements among the parties can escalate to
conflicts, and if not resolved, can lead to divorces, which may be quiet or
acrimonious litigation battles. The current problem affecting the debate on
international investment law is that all attention is being paid to the pros
and cons of dispute resolution.29 When the investor-State relationship
reaches that stage, the relationship has already been severed, and the parties
already have deviated from the path, which would have enabled them to
fully maximize the potential benefits of FDI. Simply put, the role of inter-
national investment law is currently perceived by most policy makers and
academics as dealing with acrimonious divorces.30 Moreover, because of
the high costs entailed by such divorces, many have even questioned
whether the international investment regime should be dismantled alto-
gether.31 Continuing with the analogy, this is like conceiving family law as
exclusively focused on enabling divorces. Moreover, this would suggest
that, because litigious divorces are nasty and costly, there should be no
legal regimes dealing with this problem. In the family law context, such
views would seem absurd. However, in the investment law context, this is
where the discussion currently is.
28. Policy and Promotion, supra note 11, at 14.
29. Roberto Echandi, The Blind Side of International Investment Law and Policy: The Need
for Investor-State Conflict Management Mechanisms Fostering Investment Retention and Expan-
sion, COLUM. FDI PERSP. (forthcoming 2021).
30. Id.
31. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Law as Development Law: The Obso-
lescence of a Fraudulent System, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
209 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2016).
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FIGURE 2. THE MARRIAGE AND THE INVESTOR-STATE RELATIONSHIP
ANALOGY
As will be shown in section four below, recent empirical research
shows that the overwhelming majority of “divorces” affecting investor-
State relationships occur quietly, without legal disputes and litigation in-
volved.32 Because of their low profile, those quiet divorces have been over-
looked by academic literature and most governments, becoming a serious
blindside of investment policy making.
The focus on the debate about ISDS has tended to merge that discus-
sion with the pros and cons of international investment law as a whole.
ISDS does not reflect the implementation of IIAs. On the contrary, investor-
State litigation is the result of an alleged violation of an international com-
mitment embedded in an IIA. This raises the question as to whether the
discussion is overlooking a problem affecting the effective implementation
of these international instruments. In fact, historically, one of the key policy
objectives at the root of IIAs was not to generate litigation, but rather to
generate a predictable investment climate, minimizing the risk premium for
international investors to invest abroad.33 The assumption was that IIAs, if
implemented in practice, should increase foreign investors’ confidence in
developing countries, thereby generating increasing flows of productive in-
vestment in those countries.34 It is evident that increased litigation under-
32. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 28.
33. ALVAREZ, supra note 5, at 99–100; VANDEVELDE, supra note 5.
34. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND IN-
VESTMENT FLOWS 109, 118–19 (Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
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mines the development of long-term harmonious relationships between
foreign investors and host States. Further, as section four below will explain
in more detail, evidence shows that the behaviors that IIAs are supposed to
prevent are precisely the ones leading to grievances and conflicts that also
erode the investor-State relationship, making foreign investors discontinue
their investment projects already established in developing countries.35
The point of conceiving IIAs as instruments to contribute to fostering
harmonious relationships between foreign investors and host States, rather
than just a legal framework to facilitate adjudication for dispute resolution,
is more than a philosophical one. It has very concrete and practical implica-
tions, in particular for developing countries. Around 25 percent of foreign
investors investing in developing countries opt to totally withdraw or ab-
stain from carrying out already planned investment projects, not as a result
of risks such as macroeconomic instability, civil strife, or wars, but rather
due to unattended grievances between investors and public agencies arising
from irregular government conduct that never reached international tribu-
nals.36 Thus, significant amounts of FDI—a conservative estimate shows
that around 100 billion USD a year—are being lost in developing countries
as a consequence of not addressing conflicts arising between investors and
regulatory agencies early enough.37
Thus, paradoxically, despite the significant efforts and costly invest-
ment promotion campaigns that many governments worldwide undertake to
attract FDI, most of them are not even aware of, and even less are able to
properly prevent, not only the significant amounts of FDI being lost as a
result of irregular government conduct, but also the escalation of investor-
State conflicts into full-blown legal ISDS disputes.38 Recent research has
shown that such outcome stems from the lack of an appropriate legal infra-
structure, both at a domestic and international level, enabling host States
and investors to identify and properly manage their conflicts early enough
to prevent FDI divestments and international dispute escalation. Filling this
gap is precisely the rationale of investor-State conflict management mecha-
nisms (CMMs).
Continuing with the analogy between the investor-State relationship
and marriages, CMMs can be visualized as those mechanisms that enable
the States—comprising many agencies with multiple priorities—to rapidly
articulate a coherent response to address in a nonlitigious context, a griev-
ance raised by an affected investor. Like in marriages, the earlier a problem
is directly addressed by the parties, the easier it is to deal with it, and the
chances for reaching a successful and mutually beneficial solution increase.
35. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 26.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 5–7.
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As problems become resolved, confidence among the parties is boosted and
the relationship is strengthened. CMMs act as mechanisms that may prevent
not only discontinuation of FDI projects arising from irregular government
conduct, but also costly litigation processes.
III. INVESTOR-STATE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS
Investor-State conflict management mechanisms (CMMs) can be de-
fined as those institutional or contractual mechanisms that are meant to en-
able host States and investors to effectively address their grievances at a
very early stage, preventing their conflicts from escalating into full-blown
legal disputes.39 The concept of conflict management is rooted in the dis-
tinction between the notion of “conflict” on the one hand and “legal dis-
pute” on the other. While conflict is the process of expressing
dissatisfaction, disagreement, or unmet expectations with any organiza-
tional interchange, a legal dispute is instead one of the products of conflict.
While conflicts are often amorphous and intangible, a legal dispute is tangi-
ble and concrete in the sense that it has issues, positions, and expectations
for legal relief.40 Further, while conflicts are usually dealt with between
parties themselves through the flexible use of diverse problem-solving tech-
niques, adjudication of legal disputes entails the application and interpreta-
tion of legal frameworks by a third party, i.e., an arbitrator or a judge,
resolving the dispute on the basis of legitimate legal norms and principles.41
39. Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution, supra note 4; Echandi & H.C. Gon-
stead, supra note 7, at 335.
40. CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dis-
pute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 126 (2009).
41. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161, 192–94 (2007); Mariana H.C. Gonstead, From Paper to People: Building
Conflict Resolution Capacity and Frameworks for Sustainable Implementation of IIAs to Increase
Investor-State Satisfaction, in Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration
II, supra note 22, at 55–56.
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FIGURE 3. THE INVESTOR-STATE CONFLICT CONTINUUM42
The distinction between “conflict management” and “legal dispute res-
olution” in the context of the investor-State relationship is a distinction with
many practical implications. Although CMMs may be useful to prevent dis-
putes, their most important role is to prevent investor-State grievances from
inducing investors to give up and discontinue their investments. Thus, con-
flict management should not be equated with dispute prevention policies.43
As stated before, recent research shows that only a minor fraction—less
than 10 percent—of investors who discontinue their FDI projects due to
grievances with governments seek redress through ISDS.44 The overwhelm-
ing majority withdraws quietly, well before even considering international
litigation. ISDS may be successfully prevented, and yet it may already be
too late to prevent the withdrawal or cancellation of planned FDI expansion
projects. Thus, although CMMs may be an excellent tool to prevent ISDS
disputes, the same may not work vice-versa. With their focus on the dispute
resolution phase, if successful, dispute prevention policies may prevent liti-
gation, but not necessarily be useful to support the investor-State relation-
ship and enable FDI retention and expansion.45
42. Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 291.
43. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration, U.N. Doc. No.E.10.II.D.11 (May 2010), https://unctad.org/system/
files/official-document/diaeia200911_en.pdf [hereinafter Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration].
44. Echandi, supra note 1, at 38.
45. Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, supra note 43, at 6.
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States are multilayered and administratively complex. It is not easy for
governments to identify and address an investment grievance before it de-
grades into a dispute. The objective of CMMs is to enable a lead agency or
joint body to swiftly coordinate an adequate Statewide response to a griev-
ance while it is still at an early stage of the conflict management stage.
CMMs can be contractual or institutional.46 Contractual CMMs are pre-
agreed, embedded in contracts between investors and countries—particu-
larly useful for public private partnerships.47 Institutional CMMs exist
within the administrative structure of host countries, entailing the establish-
ment of a lead agency in charge of identifying, filtering, tracking, and at-
tempting to resolve investor-State conflicts at an early stage—similar to the
various ombudsperson offices recently established in many countries in-
spired by the Korean Foreign Investment Ombudsman experience.48
Over the last decade, literature has started to advocate for the integra-
tion of innovative dispute system design approaches into international in-
vestment law.49 As part of such effort, some academic works started to
suggest elements to develop investor-State CMM protocols comprising
eight fundamental steps.50 First, stocktaking and diagnostics—understand-
ing the type of sectors and agencies involved in investor-State grievances in
a particular country.51 Second, a lead agency or lead government instance is
established to administer the CMM, including administering a tracking tool
to monitor and measure amount of FDI and jobs potentially at risk due to
the grievance.52 Third is the information sharing campaigns—alerting other
agencies and private stakeholders of the existence and functioning of the
CMM to be established.53 The fourth step is early alert mechanisms—pro-
cedures to enable the lead agency to learn about the existence of a grievance
and address it as early as possible. The fifth step is a legal and economic
assessment of the grievances, determining potential liability and jobs and
FDI at risk.54 Sixth is problem-solving techniques that enable the lead
46. Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 296.
47. Id.
48. Ricardo Figueiredo de Oliveira, The Useful Institution of an Investment Ombudsperson,
COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 273, 1 (Mar. 9, 2020), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/10/No-273-
Figueiredo-de-Oliveira-FINAL.pdf.
49. Franck, supra note 41, at 163; see also Mariana Hernandez-Crespo Gonstead, Remedy
Without Diagnosis: How to Optimize Results by Leveraging the Appropriate Dispute Resolution
and Shared Decision-Making Process, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2165 (2020); Mariana Hernandez-
Crespo Gonstead, A New Dance on the Global Stage: Introducing a Cultural Value-Based Tool-
box to Optimize Problem-Solving, Innovation, and Growth, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675
(2019).
50. Investor-State Conflict Management, supra note 4; Complementing Investor-State Dis-
pute Resolution, supra note 4, at 299.
51. Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 299.
52. Id. at 300.
53. Id. at 300–01.
54. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3.
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agency to interact with stakeholders in order to seek a solution to the prob-
lem.55 The seventh step is political decision-making—protocols to escalate
the matter to the highest authorities within the administration when solu-
tions have not been found at a technical level.56 And last but not least, the
eighth step is setting up appropriate mechanisms and incentives to ensure
the execution and enforcement of the political decision.57
Both the CMM concept and suggested protocols were tested in prac-
tice as part of a comprehensive project lead by the author and implemented
between 2013 and 2019 by the investment policy and promotion team of the
World Bank Group (WBG).58 A detailed analysis of the project and its key
findings have been published elsewhere.59 For purposes of this article, a
succinct summary is presented in section VI.
IV. CMMS: FINDINGS FROM RECENT RESEARCH
Research recently published by the WBG in cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Commission focused on two critical points.60 First, it examined em-
pirical evidence to better understand the nature, sectors, and political
economy dynamics of the investor-State conflict and contrasted such infor-
mation with available data on ISDS in order to test in practice the hypothe-
sis of the investor-State conflict continuum.61 Second, the research project
also tested the feasibility of CMM protocols proposed by literature62
through a series of pilot projects undertaken in eight countries in different
regions of the world.63
A. Findings from Empirical Research
As stated above, empirical research tested in practices the hypothesis
of the investor-State conflict continuum. For that purpose, it examined em-
pirical evidence to better understand the nature, sectors, and political econ-
omy dynamics of the investor-State conflict and contrasted such
information with available data on ISDS. The hypothesis of the existence of
the continuum would be demonstrated if empirical data showed a corre-
spondence between the type of regulatory conduct generating conflicts and






60. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3.
61. Id.
62. Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution, supra note 4.
63. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3.
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State conflict was collected on the basis of surveys and data on investor-
State disputes on available statistical evidence on investor-State arbitration.
1. Survey evidence on investor-State conflict
The empirical research project started with a set of six different
surveys done by the WBG, five done by the Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency (MIGA) between 2008 and 2013 and another one done by the
Investment Policy and Promotion (IPP) Team of the WBG in 2017.64 Taken
together, these surveys cover almost a decade and more than 2,500 interna-
tional investors investing in developing countries.65 These surveys targeted
international investors—from both developed and developing countries—
and asked a series of questions to explore how government conduct has
influenced their decisions to remain or expand their FDI projects in devel-
oping countries, or conversely, withdraw or cancel investment plans.66
Based on this survey data, research addressed the following four ques-
tions: (i) to what extent have political risks arising from government con-
duct influenced investors’ decisions? (ii) which are the specific types of
government conduct that have been most disruptive to FDI over the last
decade? (iii) if patterns of disruptive government conduct over FDI can be
identified, have they affected different types of FDI in a similar manner?
and (iv) what does empirical evidence suggest regarding the means that
investors have used to deal with grievances arising from government
conduct?67
The WBG research project also went beyond survey data and con-
trasted the findings of investors’ perceptions with factual trends identified
by recent empirical analyses on ISDS cases.68 In particular, the study fo-
cused on four key aspects: (i) whether investors’ views regarding the types
of government conduct generating FDI project withdrawal and cancellation
coincide with the type of government conduct subject to international inves-
tor-State adjudication, (ii) whether the types of conduct generating greater
impact on FDI withdrawal and expansion cancellation coincide with the
types of conduct most frequently contested in ISDS procedures, (iii)
64. MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, World Investment and Political Risk (2009), https://
www.miga.org/report/world-investment-and-political-risk-2009; MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR.
AGENCY, World Investment and Political Risk (2010), https://www.miga.org/report/world-invest-
ment-and-political-risk-2010; MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, World Investment and Politi-
cal Risk (2011), https://www.miga.org/report/world-investment-and-political-risk-2011;
MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, World Investment and Political Risk (2012), https://
www.miga.org/report/world-investment-and-political-risk-2012; MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR.
AGENCY, World Investment and Political Risk (2013), https://www.miga.org/report/world-invest-
ment-and-political-risk-2013 [hereinafter World Investment and Political Risk 2013].
65. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Echandi, supra note 1, at 32; FRANCK, supra note 1.
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whether the sectors and type of FDI affected by withdrawal of existing in-
vestment or cancellation of planned ones coincide with those most common
in ISDS trends, and (iv) what the empirical data reveal about the context in
which investors would opt to invoke ISDS.69
In a nutshell, the survey data used in the first part of this paper showed
four basic trends. First, international investors have consistently ranked po-
litical risk among the top important constraints for FDI.70 In this context,
political risk is defined as the probability of disruption of operation of mul-
tinational enterprises by political forces or events.71 In fact, political risk
was identified by investors as the most important constraint for FDI in de-
veloping economies during the surveys done between 2008 and 2013,
which resonates with the fact that in 2017, 86 percent of the investors sur-
veyed found the legal and regulatory environment important or critically
important when making investment decisions.72
Between 2008 and 2013, when investors were asked to specify what
type of political risk they cared most about, their concerns were not focused
on variables such as war, civil unrest, or terrorism.73 Instead, investors were
consistently more disrupted by political risks related to government con-
duct, such as adverse regulatory changes, breach of contract or transfers,
and convertibility restrictions.74 Such finding may explain why in 2017, 45
percent of investors surveyed rated investment protection guarantees as crit-
ically important or deal-breakers when investing abroad, notably, the high-
est among all investment climate factors.75 In addition, over 80 percent of
investors rated various types of legal protections as important or critically
important.76
Second, all surveys consistently showed an average of 25 percent of
investors surveyed over the period either totally withdrew or canceled al-
ready planned FDI expansion plans due to government conduct.77 Griev-
ances related to expropriation, transfers and convertibility restrictions,
breach of contract, and adverse regulatory changes have continuously
ranked among the most impactful actions by governments leading to FDI
69. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 2.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Yadong Luo, Political Risk and Country Risk in International Business: Concepts and
Measures, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 740, 741 (2d ed.) (Alan M.
Rugman ed., 2008).
72. World Investment and Political Risk 2013, supra note 64, at 37.
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 19.
75. World Bank Group, Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign In-
vestor Perspectives and Policy Implications, at 27 (2018), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/28493 [hereinafter Report 2017/2018].
76. Id. at 20.
77. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 24.
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withdrawals and expansion cancellations.78 Despite being the most im-
pactful regulatory risks, the frequency of situations related to expropriation
and breach of contract has tended to decline over the last decade, while
risks associated with sudden adverse regulatory changes have been a con-
stant prominent role over the period, both in terms of frequency and im-
pact.79 Problems related to transfer and convertibility restrictions have
constantly remained in the middle of the curve in terms of frequency and
impact.
The 2017 survey revealed two additional types of government conduct
with significant frequency and impact on FDI retention and expansion: the
lack of transparency and predictability in dealing with public agencies and
the delays in obtaining the necessary government permits to start or operate
a business.80 These two types of regulatory risks, together with sudden ad-
verse regulatory changes, mean that the lion’s share of the grievances lead-
ing to FDI divestments relate to the ways that government agencies perform
their routine regulatory functions.
Third, turning to which sectors concentrate the majority of FDI divest-
ments as a result of regulatory risks, data show that political risk affects all
sectors and types of investment.81 However, as the composition of FDI has
changed over time, the relative share of different sectors on total FDI
divestments occurring due to disrupting government conduct has also
tended to evolve. While in the 1970s most FDI divestments were associated
with expropriations occurring in the natural resource sector, the 2017 data
showed a higher frequency of FDI withdrawal among investors in the ser-
vices sector.82 Services comprise the largest share of FDI worldwide.83 Fur-
thermore, services trade is inherently about managing horizontal and sector-
specific regulations. Because the frequency of political risks arising from
government conduct related to the enactment and operation of regulations
has increased, it follows that the services sector will be particularly
vulnerable.
Data also show that investors in the services sector are not only more
frequently hit by regulatory risks than manufacturing but are also more sen-
sitive to such risks and, as a result, withdraw and cancel expansion plans
more frequently.84 Within this context, it is not surprising that investors in
services are also those who place investment protection guarantees as the
most important item on an investment climate agenda in developing coun-
tries and are those who value more IIAs.
78. Id. at 26.
79. Id.
80. Report 2017/2018, supra note 75, at 33.
81. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3.
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 32.
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The relative lower frequency of withdrawals in natural resource-seek-
ing FDI should not be interpreted as indicating that the primary sector is
now less affected by political risks. That conclusion would be incorrect.
This trend may have more to do with the fact that these types of FDI
projects are more difficult to withdraw simply because they are tied to the
location where the natural resources are located. Further, with the exception
of Africa, the primary sector represents a significantly lower share of the
total FDI stock in developing countries.85 Natural resource-seeking FDI is
particularly vulnerable to risks of expropriation and to breach of contract,
especially in extractives.86 As expropriations have become less frequent, the
primary sector has decreased its exposure to this type of political risk. The
practical difficulty of withdrawal, and the inherent risk of this type of FDI
towards these types of government practices, explains why investor-State
conflict in natural resource-seeking FDI ranks among the top types of FDI
projects that in the end escalate to investor-State legal dispute resolution.
Fourth, regarding the question as to how investors deal with political
risks arising from government conduct, the set of surveys conducted over
the period reveals a paradox.87 On the one hand, direct engagement with
governments ranks among the risk mitigation tools most frequently used by
foreign investors in developing countries to address this type of problem.88
On the other hand, when asked about how effective such engagement is in
practice, most investors show a high degree of dissatisfaction.89 This find-
ing shows that, when problems arise, investors’ first step is to engage in
consultations with host governments, rather than turning to litigation. Fur-
ther, it also shows “that the high rates of FDI withdrawals and expansion
cancellations result not only from the disruptive conduct, but also from the
lack of a timely and appropriate response by the authorities involved in
resolving that problem.”90 This fact evidences the existence of factors af-
fecting the capacity of the governments to promptly and appropriately re-
spond to foreign investors when the latter attempt to engage with public
authorities to resolve an investment-related problem or grievance. The anal-
ysis of the experience of ISDS over the last thirty years, provides important
hints to explain the political economy behind this trend.
85. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, International Production Beyond the Pan-
demic, World Investment Report (2020), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/
wir2020_en.pdf [hereinafter International Production Beyond the Pandemic].
86. World Investment and Political Risk 2013, supra note 64, at 19.
87. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 27.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 28.
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2. Contrasting survey evidence on investor-State conflict with
empirical evidence on ISDS
Contrasting the findings derived from survey data with findings de-
rived from the empirical analysis on ISDS revealed five basic trends.
First, empirical evidence shows a clear correlation between the specific
types of government conduct inducing FDI divestments with those leading
to ISDS claims. The most common breaches alleged by investors in ISDS
proceedings are those violating the fair and equitable treatment (FET); indi-
rect expropriation; full protection and security, or similar; and arbitrary, un-
reasonable, and discriminatory measures. When examining the co-relation
with the four types of government conduct categories leading to FDI divest-
ments, it turns out that a lack of transparency and predictability of govern-
ment agencies as well as adverse regulatory changes seem to be the main
sources of contention between investors and host governments.91 Thus, this
is an area where empirical data on investors’ surveys and ISDS data
coincide.
Second, the research showed that in addition to indirect expropriations,
the most common types of regulatory conduct found to breach IIAs also
tend to coincide with those most frequently alleged by investors: fair and
equitable treatment; full protection and security; and arbitrary, unreasona-
ble, and discriminatory measures.92 This trend is very revealing, as all of
these types of conduct are comprised by a single standard of protection
included in many IIAs as well as customary international law called the
Minimum Standard of Treatment that host governments are obliged to pro-
vide to aliens.
The Minimum Treatment Standard is a commitment that imposes on
governments not an obligation to generate a specific outcome in favor of
investors (an obligation of results), but rather an obligation of conduct, pre-
scribing how governments should behave in their routine regulatory action.
This standard asks that government action be transparent, coherent, reason-
able in performing their actions, use proportionate solutions to the problems
governments are dealing with, and act consistently with expectations raised
to foreign investors based on written commitments undertaken by govern-
ments either through contracts or investment authorizations. This finding
corroborates surveys’ data that places lack of transparency and predictabil-
ity in dealing with public agencies and sudden adverse regulatory changes
as the most frequent government conduct inducing FDI divestments.93
Third, a key finding complementing the previous one is that around 70
percent of ISDS claims involved measures adopted by subnational or sec-
91. See Echandi, supra note 1, at 60.
92. Id. at 38 n.21.
93. Id. at 29.
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tor-specific regulatory agencies.94 This confirms that one of the key chal-
lenges of modern administrative regimes is how to foster coherent policy
implementation within a multilayered governance structure. It also reveals a
tension between the single state paradigm at the core of domestic and inter-
national legal systems on the one hand and the multilayered agency compo-
sition of governments on the other. There is a gap between the law “in the
books” and reality. In this sense, evidence suggests that IIAs in general, and
ISDS in particular, have been generating pressure for States to behave in
accordance with the one State legal paradigm, an outcome that is not always
easy to achieve.95 The fact that most of the measures generating ISDS dis-
putes have been taken by subnational or autonomous regulatory authorities
shows the challenge that many governments face in ensuring this minimum
level of policy coherence.96
Fourth, examining the economic sectors where ISDS occurs most fre-
quently reveals a clear political economy pattern of investor-State griev-
ances. Empirical data clearly show that, although ISDS has taken place in a
wide range of areas, many of the disputes tend to arise in economic sectors
characterized by high levels of State intervention.97 First, there are services
that many countries consider of “public interest” and are thus subject to
close State supervision, such as utilities—water and electricity distribu-
tion—and other highly regulated services like telecommunications, trans-
portation, and to a lesser degree, financial services. Second, another area
where ISDS tends to occur most frequently is in services where public-
private partnerships are typical, such as construction, and power and trans-
port infrastructure. A third area where ISDS also frequently tends to occur
in natural resource industries, such as extractives (oil, gas, and mining) as
well as agriculture, fishing, and forestry.98
Fifth, data also show that only a very minor share of investors with-
drawing or canceling FDI expansion plans opt to invoke ISDS. The rate of
frequency of investors divesting from developing countries in all surveys
consistently was around 25 percent of the total interviewed.99 Considering
that today there are more than one hundred thousand foreign affiliates un-
94. See Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which Host Country Government Actors are
Most Involved in Disputes with Foreign Investors?, VALE COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT’L
INV. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/which-host-country-government-ac-
tors-are-most-involved-disputes-foreign-investors; see also Zoe Phillips Williams, Risky Business
or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor-State Disputes?, INV. TREATY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2014/08/12/risky-business-or-risky-politics-what-explains-investor-
state-disputes.
95. Mark A. Clodfelter, “Why Aren’t More Investor-State Treaty Disputes Settled Amica-
bly?”, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. 49–52 (2011).
96. Id.
97. Echandi, supra note 1, at 51.
98. FRANCK, supra note 1.
99. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at IX.
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dertaking multiple investment projects worldwide,100 and even assuming
that only half of them invested in developing countries, a 25 percent rate of
FDI divestments would represent more than ten thousand potential ISDS
claims against developing countries.101 Even cutting such rough estimate by
half would lead to a figure that would still be significantly higher than the
actual number of ISDS submitted against developing countries over the last
thirty years.
The finding that most foreign investors who may be canceling invest-
ment plans or withdrawing their investments and yet abstaining from invok-
ing ISDS has a very critical and practical policy implication. Governments
should be careful to avoid falling into the trap of confusing mechanisms to
prevent ISDS disputes—dispute prevention—from mechanisms to prevent
investors from withdrawing or canceling FDI projects. Investment retention
and expansion and dispute prevention are two very different things, and one
may not necessarily entail the other.
B. Findings from CMMs pilot projects
Not only has the investor-State conflict continuum concept been tested
empirically, but the mechanisms on how to manage it have as well. The
CMMs developed by specialized literature have also been tested in practice.
Between 2015 and 2019, the WBG developed a solution package not only
to pilot CMMs, but also seeking two additional concrete objectives.102 First,
such pilots should be able to be implemented within real political time
frames—maximum three to four years—which correspond to the time of
most government administrations. Second, this tool should be designed in
such a way that its effectiveness could be measured in terms of objective
impact indicators.
The design of such a solution package started with literature review103
and a series of case studies observing different experiences and good prac-
tices around the world as to how different governments were addressing
risks derived from government conduct.104 The research found that most
policy makers have not yet “connected the dots” between investment reten-
tion and expansion on the one hand and political risk derived from govern-
ment conduct on the other.105 However, various governments nevertheless
had started to take steps in different—yet convergent—directions. In this
regard, two patterns became evident.106
100. International Production Beyond the Pandemic, supra note 87, at 22, 124.
101. Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD and WBG data.
102. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 39.
103. Echandi et al., supra note 10.
104. Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, supra note 43.
105. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 41.
106. Id.
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First, those countries focusing on investment retention and expansion
had deployed aftercare programs. In this regard, a particular case study
worth mentioning is Korea with its Foreign Investment Ombudsman Office
(OFIO), considered as one of the most sophisticated aftercare programs in
the world.107 A second strand of policies undertaken by many governments
prioritized the focus on the political risk side of the equation, rather than the
investment retention and expansion. This has been the experience of various
Latin American countries, which over the last two decades have been the
most frequently hit by claims submitted by foreign investors to Interna-
tional Investment arbitration under IIAs.108 Within this context, it is not
surprising that over the last decade, the issue of ISDS dispute prevention
started to strongly resonate among Latin American countries, leading them
to start taking pioneering steps in this field.109
These two sets of experiences revealed that while some countries have
started to concentrate their attention on the beginning of the investor-State
conflict continuum, focusing on addressing problems affecting investors at
an early stage before they have escalated to grievances and placing the FDI
at risk of withdrawal of expansion cancellation, efforts by other countries
have focused on the opposite side of spectrum—that is, dispute prevention.
In these later cases, governments frequently hit by ISDS have started to
focus their inter-institutional coordination efforts on properly responding to
and managing ISDS disputes, and more recently focusing on efforts to pre-
vent international legal dispute escalation—dispute prevention. The prob-
lem with both of these approaches is that none of them fully connects the
dots between the two extremes of the investor-State conflict continuum.
While aftercare may focus on investment retention, it may have to deal
with issues that go beyond government conduct placing FDI at risk of with-
drawal or cancellation of expansion. It is often very difficult for investment
promotion agencies to learn about grievances arising with investors who
usually do not interact with those agencies in the first place. WBG research
shows that a significant share of grievances arises with investors engaged in
domestic-market seeking activities, in particular in services sectors and in-
vestors involved in public/private partnerships and other government con-
tracts.110 Investors investing in natural resources, particularly in extractives,
often interact with ministries in charge of mining, energy, and/or the envi-
ronment directly. In those cases, investors do not usually enter the host
economy with the support of investment promotion agencies, and therefore,
107. FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN OF KOREA, http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/au/
message.do (last visited Nov. 8, 2020); see Nicolas et al., Lessons from Investment Policy Reform
in Korea, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working Paper No. 2013/02
(2013).
108. Echandi, supra note 1, at 59.
109. Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, supra note 22.
110. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at XI.
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they may not seek the latter to provide any assistance when dealing with
their government counterparts. Further, agencies in charge of servicing for-
eign investors (investment promotion agencies) do not have the mandate,
legal attributions, or political clout to deal with other government agencies
whose conduct may risk losing FDI.
On the other hand, dispute prevention policies focus on preventing es-
calation of grievances into international legal disputes but not on FDI reten-
tion and expansion. Agencies interested in preventing investor-State
arbitration are often those in charge of implementing IIAs, ministries of
trade and investment, and/or ministries of justice or attorneys general of-
fices that are in charge of representing the host State in international arbitra-
tion proceedings (hereinafter “competent agencies”). These competent
agencies often have staff with technical skills and, in certain circumstances,
may even have enough political clout to settle certain ISDS disputes. How-
ever, because the mandate of these competent agencies is focused on nego-
tiating, implementing, or enforcing IIAs, they traditionally get involved in
investor-State grievances once the latter have in fact escalated into legal
disputes.111
Review of practices around the world led the WBG to develop a CMM
protocol that was denominated the “Systemic Investment Response Mecha-
nism” (SIRM) as a practical solution package to (1) enable governments to
identify, track, and timely resolve investor-State grievances that put invest-
ment projects at risk of divestment and (2) quantify the host State’s  risk of
facing potential liability under applicable domestic or international invest-
ment rules.112 The SIRM collects data, identifies patterns on the source of
government-generated political risks affecting investments, and quantifies
investment retained, expanded, or lost as consequences of addressing or not
addressing those political risks.113 The SIRM entails the empowerment of a
reform-oriented government agency and the establishment of an inter-gov-
ernmental mechanism to systematically address grievances arising from
government conduct, thereby reducing this type of political risk at their
source. The lead government agency brings to the attention of high levels of
government problems affecting investments to address them before they es-
calate further.114
Thus far, the WBG has piloted the SIRM/CMM in at least eight coun-
tries in Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe, Central Asia, the Mid-
111. Id. at XII.
112. The G-20 Compact with Africa, A Joint AfDB, IMF and WBG Report, G-20 FIN. MINIS-




114. Id. at 23.
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dle East, North and Southeast Asia, and East Africa.115 Up to the end of
2019, with just one exception, all the SIRM pilots were still in execution.116
Depending on the particular context of the host country, some pilots have
advanced more swiftly than others. Therefore, although it may still be early
for a sample big enough to generate statistically relevant data, the pilots do
provide some preliminary firm-level evidence regarding the type of griev-
ances impacting the investors, the most frequent matters that generate con-
flicts, the most common sectors and types of FDI affected by regulatory
conduct, and even some—albeit very initial—estimates on the magnitude of
investments at risk that have been already retained and expanded in selected
cases.117 Equally important, these pilots have tested in practice the feasibil-
ity for host governments to set up effective CMMs.
Regarding the investor-State conflict continuum, data so far generated
from SIRM/CMM pilots clearly confirm the findings of WBG empirical
research on the impact of government conduct on investment retention and
expansion.118 Pilots show that the number of grievances that are serious
enough to place investment at risk tends to be significantly lower than the
number of minor problems that investors face in their routine operations
and that are usually dealt with via aftercare programs.119 Despite being less
frequent than minor problems, the economic impact of grievances placing
FDI at risk is significant. In the case of one SIRM/CMM pilot, three spe-
cific FDI projects where the grievances were effectively resolved led to an
amount of investment effectively retained/expanded equivalent to 200 mil-
lion USD in investment retained, 20 million USD in reinvestments, and a
conservative estimate of 10 million USD in public cost savings derived
from verified prevention of three investor-State arbitration proceedings.120
Among all regulatory risks arising from government conduct, patterns
of sudden/arbitrary regulatory conduct seem to be the most common type of
grievances placing investment at risk. Although each pilot sample has a
different period, except for just one country, the most common type of con-
duct leading to serious grievances falls within this type of regulatory risk
conduct. Drilling down into more detail within this category, abuse of au-
thority, abuse of discretion when interpreting laws and regulations, and lack
of transparency are the most common sources of grievances. This finding
resonates with the trend revealed by empirical research that alleged viola-
tions to the minimum standard of treatment is the most frequent investment
115. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at XII.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 57.
118. Id. at 57–58.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id.
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protection guarantee invoked in ISDS proceedings and the most frequently
breached in international arbitration awards.
Further, it is worth noting that arbitrary conduct as perceived by inves-
tors invoking the SIRM/CMM tend to concentrate in matters related to taxa-
tion and compliance with investment incentives offered to investors—both
in terms of custom duties and tax benefits. In addition, other very common
problems perceived as arbitrary conduct relate to the application of customs
procedures, cancellation or lack of renewal of licenses required for opera-
tions both for mining and services, problems related to renewal/cancellation
of land leases, environmental and labor permit delays, or inspection infrac-
tions leading to cancellation of operations.
As far as sectors are concerned, pilots have shown that grievances arise
in all primary, manufacturing, and services sectors. However, once again,
following the same trend evidenced by empirical research, most of the
grievances tend to significantly concentrate in the primary and tertiary sec-
tors.121 Cancellation or nonrenewal of land leases, exploration licenses and
concessions on extractive activities, infractions due to alleged violations of
local content requirements or labor standards, and environmental permit
withdrawals tend to concentrate grievances in natural resource-seeking
FDI.122 Taxation problems, allegations of breach of contract, cancellation of
land leases and operation licenses, and fines imposed due to alleged regula-
tory infractions tend to be the most common types of grievances affecting
domestic market-seeking in services.123
Pilots have also confirmed findings of empirical research on the types
of FDI most frequently affected by regulatory risks. In this regard, investors
involved in export-oriented activities as part of global value chains (GVCs)
experience a significantly lower number of grievances.124 It seems that the
fact that the bulk of this efficiency-seeking FDI operates within special eco-
nomic zones or industrial parks in a way shields it from the challenge of
interacting with an uncoordinated multilayered web of public agencies. Re-
garding which types of agencies tend to more frequently generate investor-
State grievances, once again, SIRM pilots coincide with empirical research,
revealing the critical role that specialized and subnational regulatory agen-
cies play in generating most of the conflicts.125
Third, although still ongoing, SIRM/CMM piloting also provides very
useful practical lessons, both on the operation of CMMs and their function-
ing from a political economy perspective. Regarding operational lessons
121. See Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and
Policy Responses, supra note 3, at 31.
122. Id. at 59–60.
123. Id.
124. Echandi, supra note 1, at 53.
125. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at XIII.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST203.txt unknown Seq: 28  3-JUN-21 12:32
246 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
learned so far, pilots show that although CMMs require country-specific
customization, there are a series of hands-on common issues that come
across all countries on various components, for instance, the composition
and positioning of the lead agency, the design and deployment of the infor-
mation and communication technology (ICT) tracking tool to register, fol-
low up, and measure the impact of resolving—or failing to resolve—
grievances, and the coordination protocols to ensure inter-agency coordina-
tion and collaboration in resolving investor-State conflicts. This note drills
on each of these elements in significant detail. A similar situation occurs
regarding the political economy within which CMMs must operate. Within
the highly idiosyncratic nature of political economy to each country, SIRM/
CMM pilots have nevertheless started to reveal interesting common
patterns.
A fundamental finding derived from observing successful problem-
solving techniques in SIRM pilots is the critical role that IIAs—more than
domestic law—play in enabling the SIRM/CMM lead agency to negotiate
in the “shadow of the law” when seeking the collaboration of peer agencies
in attempting to resolve a grievance.126 The same can be said of the very
persuasive effect that diplomatic pressure exerted by investors’ home-State
governments can have in invoking previously agreed international commit-
ments with the host countries. Pilots demonstrate that, rather than fostering
power-oriented politics, IIAs are starting to play a catalytic role in fostering
patterns of rule-based negotiation among different agencies within a host
government, even to the benefit of domestic investors.127
SIRM/CMM pilots have also shown the importance of using key per-
formance indicators (KPIs) to measure the impact of these mechanisms and
how such KPIs can shift the political economy of investor-State conflict
into positive dynamics for politicians and government officials.128 As
shown in figure 4 below, the pilots have entailed setting up a tracking tool
to measure the investment and jobs at risk of being lost as a result of an
investor-State grievance.
126. Id. at 65–66.
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id.
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Source: World Bank Group 2019.
Note: SIRM = Systematic Investment Response Mechanism.
SIRM Tracking Tool: What Gets Measured, Gets Done
Problems Generated due to Government Conduct










FIGURE 4. SIRM/CMM PILOTS: THE USE OF KEY PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS129
As soon as the grievance is registered by the lead agency, a first as-
sessment entails a determination of the “temperature” of the conflict with
the investor. That is done by examining different objective variables, such
as how long the problem has remained unresolved, what that problem costs
the investor, whether the investor has already contacted another government
agency to address the problem, whether the matter has also been communi-
cated to the home-State country’s embassy in the host State, etc. On such
objective criteria, the lead agency can get an idea of the extent the grievance
at hand has degraded within the investor-State conflict continuum line.
Once such determination is made, a legal early evaluation is conducted,
basically assessing, if the grievance at hand escalated into a full-blown dis-
pute, how likely it is that the host State will be found liable under an IIA.
Last but not least, the assessment also measures the amount of investment at
risk and, more importantly, how many jobs are also at risk of being lost if
the FDI project was discontinued. WBG pilots in countries like Vietnam,
Georgia, and Mongolia corroborate these trends.130
The amount of investment and jobs at risk of being lost as a result of
the grievance would immediately cease to be at risk if the conflict was
effectively resolved. Therefore, it follows that such investment and jobs
originally at risk would become jobs and investment retained as a result of
the functioning of the SIRM/CMM. Further, if as a result of resolving the
conflict, investors opted to expand their operations in an environment where
their confidence and level of comfort in the country improved, such invest-
129. Id. at 52.
130. Id. at 4, 51, 61.
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ment and associated jobs would be tantamount to the investment and jobs
expanded/generated. In sum, by measuring the positive effects of maintain-
ing the investor-State relationship rather than focusing on the costs of the
conflict and disputes, the SIRM/CMM pilots have tended to generate politi-
cal economy dynamics positively inducing government behaviors that cor-
respond to those expected as a result of the application of the IIAs and
domestic laws in most jurisdictions.
By focusing on measuring results that may be politically attractive for
governments to publicly announce, the incentives for the administrative bu-
reaucracy to make use of the SIRM/CMMs have increased.131 Indeed, mea-
suring the amount of FDI and jobs that an intervention of technical-level
bureaucrats can generate as a result of timely addressing investor-State con-
flicts has been much more productive than measuring the costs or negative
consequences of not doing so. Few government officials are interested in
measuring negative effects that, if publicly disclosed, may negatively taint
the performance of the administration. Conversely, most government offi-
cials have been much more interested in measuring the positive results that
their efficient performance may have on aspects that are politically valuable
for their bosses. What is more valuable for politicians than showing how
their administrations are contributing to retaining and expanding jobs, in-
vestment, and exports? Further, aren’t these the same results that interna-
tional investment law should promote?
In sum, SIRM/CMMs pilots have shown a very practical way for
countries to leverage IIAs in a nonlitigious manner to induce desired pat-
terns of behavior among domestic regulatory agencies. From this perspec-
tive, it could be argued that SIRMs/CMMs are not only tools to properly
implement IIAs on the ground, but also more in tune with IIAs’ original
intent: to mitigate political risks in cross-border investment transactions.
V. CONCLUSIONS: LEVERAGING CMMS TO STRENGTHEN INVESTOR-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS AND MAXIMIZE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
There is consensus that from a historical point of view, the original
purpose of IIAs was to mitigate risk from opportunistic government behav-
ior, thereby increasing investors’ confidence to undertake productive FDI
projects beyond their home States. However, recent research has demon-
strated a more specific point: from an economic development perspective,
such political risk mitigation function is not useful—neither to host States
nor investors—if it is exclusively done ex-post facto (that is, if enforcement
of rules and disciplines is sought after the damage has been done and the
investor-State relationship has been already severed, leading the investor to
131. Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy
Responses, supra note 3, at 60–61.
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withdraw or cancel the expansion of an investment project). For IIAs to
fulfill their development function, mechanisms have to be put in place to
ensure that their provisions actually influence government behavior well
before the investor-State relationship has deteriorated to such a degree that
investors opt to discontinue their FDI projects. Simply said, from this van-
tage point, a key function of IIAs is to contribute to retention and expansion
of FDI.
Regardless of how obvious this conclusion may be, surprisingly,
neither academia nor policymaking have paid attention to the practicalities
of how to implement those IIAs on the ground to achieve that objective.
Implementation is meant here to leverage IIAs in such a way that their
provisions influence government behavior on the ground, thereby improv-
ing investors’ confidence and contributing to the retention and expansion of
investments and its externalities in the host economy. Evidently, ISDS does
not entail implementation of IIAs, but is rather a symptom of a lack of it.
Yet, despite the controversy ISDS has generated in the academic and policy
community about the role of international investment law and development,
the attention on whether IIAs are contributing to retention and expansion of
FDI has been absent. This is the blindside of international investment law
that this article has attempted to unveil.
This article has argued that recent research has demonstrated that, in
fact, it is through the use of CMMs that countries can effectively implement
IIAs. The findings of such research echo the seminal work of Cottier132 on
multilayered governance and Kingsbury and Schill on global administrative
law133 by showing how trends in the evolution of investor-State conflicts
evidence one of the key challenges for governments in times of globaliza-
tion: the growing tension between the single-state paradigm at the core of
domestic and international legal systems on the one hand, and on the other,
the governance fragmentation derived from the multilayered agency com-
position of most governments worldwide—which has been exacerbated in
the last three decades by administrative decentralization.
Just as globalization is pressuring investors to compete in more inter-
active and contestable markets, it is also pressuring governments to set up
mechanisms to ensure a minimum level of administrative coherence among
dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of agencies comprising the public ad-
ministration, both at a national and subnational level. Capacity to ensure
coherent, regular government conduct based on the fundamental norms and
132. Thomas Cottier, Towards a Five Storey House, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 495 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., Hart Publishing 2011).
133. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance:
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law
(New York University School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 09-46,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=657655v.
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principles of IIAs among a plethora of administrative actors is becoming
challenging for governments. However, such challenge should not be ig-
nored by promoting the elimination of international rules fostering adminis-
trative discipline. On the contrary, this calls for more efficient, creative, and
pragmatic mechanisms to foster the rule of law, especially if FDI is to be
leveraged for development. This is precisely the role that CMMs aim to
fulfill.
Nowadays, the most frequent and pressing political demand posed by
civil society to their respective governments is the generation of jobs and
better standards of living. Such objectives cannot be reached if investment
projects are constantly canceled. CMMs incorporating tracking mechanisms
provide a great opportunity for both bureaucrats and governments as a
whole to quantify the results of their efforts to retain and expand investment
and their associated jobs and externalities. By measuring politically attrac-
tive data, government officials have an incentive to behave in line with the
principles that IIA aim to promote.
